Abstract. TLS is the most important cryptographic protocol in use today. However, up to now there is no complete cryptographic security proof in the standard model, nor in any other model. We give the first such proof for the core cryptographic protocol of TLS ciphersuites based on ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange (TLS-DHE), which include the cipher suite TLS DHE DSS WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA mandatory in TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1. It is impossible to prove security of the TLS Handshake protocol in any classical key-indistinguishability-based security model (like for instance the Bellare-Rogaway or the Canetti-Krawczyk model), due to subtle issues with the encryption of the final Finished messages. Therefore we start with proving the security of a truncated version of the TLS-DHE Handshake protocol, which has been considered in previous works on TLS. Then we define the notion of authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) as a new security model which captures precisely the security properties expected from TLS in practice, and show that the combination of the TLS Handshake with data encryption in the TLS Record Layer can be proven secure in this model.
Introduction
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the single most important Internet security mechanism today. Session keys in TLS are established in the TLS Handshake protocol, using either encrypted key transport (TLS-RSA) or (ephemeral) DiffieHellman key exchange (TLS-DH(E)), whereas authentication can be provided mutual or server-only. Due to a subtle interleaving of the TLS Handshake with the TLS Record Layer it is impossible to prove the security of TLS using wellestablished security models [4, 10, 9] , which define security via indistinguishability of keys (see [18] for a detailed description of this issue). Therefore there is no security proof for the complete protocol up to now.
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The paradox that the most important authenticated key-exchange (AKE) protocol cannot be proven secure in any existing security model can be solved in two ways. Either one considers a modified version of the TLS Handshake protocol ('truncated TLS'), which was subject to previous work [20] , or a new security model for the combination of TLS Handshake protocol and data encryption in the TLS Record Layer must be devised. In this paper we follow both approaches.
Contributions
We provide new security results for the core cryptographic protocol of TLS based on ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange (TLS-DHE).
First we give a formal proof that the truncated version of the TLS-DHE Handshake protocol from [20] is a secure authenticated key exchange protocol. We consider a security model which extends the well-known Bellare-Rogaway model [4] to adaptive corruptions and perfect forward secrecy in the public-key setting (cf. [6] ). This allows to compare our results to previous work.
Second we define the notion of authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE). ACCE protocols are an extension of AKE protocols, in the sense that the symmetric cipher is integrated into the model. In contrast to AKE protocols, where one requires key indistinguishability, we demand that a secure ACCE protocol allows to establish a 'secure communication channel' in the sense of stateful length-hiding authenticated encryption [22] . Loosely speaking, an ACCE channel guarantees that messages written to this channel are confidential (indistinguishable, and even the length of messages is concealed up to some granularity), and that a sequence of messages read from this channel corresponds exactly to the sequence of messages sent by the legitimate sender (of course up to dropping messages at the very end of the sequence, which is always possible). This captures exactly the properties expected from TLS-like protocols in practice. We prove that the combination of the TLS Handshake protocol with the TLS Record Layer forms a secure ACCE protocol, if the TLS Record Layer provides security in the sense of length-hiding authenticated encryption. Note that the latter was proven recently by Paterson et al. [22] for CBC-based Record Layer protocols.
The analyses of both truncated TLS-DHE (as an AKE protocol) and TLS-DHE (as an ACCE protocol) require, that the building blocks of TLS-DHE (digital signature scheme, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, symmetric cipher) meet certain security properties. The majority of these properties are standard assumptions, solely for the pseudo-random function we require an additional non-standard security assumption, which is a variant of the Oracle Diffie-Hellman assumption introduced by Abdalla, Bellare, and Rogaway [1] . We explain in Section 6 why such an assumptions seems hard to avoid. Our proof is stated for mutual authentication, i.e., the client authenticates itself using a client certificate. This allows us to base our work on standard definitions for secure authenticated key exchange.
Interpretation
Our results show that the core cryptographic protocol of TLS-DHE is cryptographically sound, if its building blocks are suitably secure (the full version [18] of this paper contains an analysis to what extent the concrete building blocks of TLS meet the required properties, here we can build upon previous work that considered particular components of TLS).
We note that TLS-DHE is much less used in practice than TLS with encrypted key transport (TLS-RSA). Moreover, we consider mutual authentication (that is, both the client and the server are in possession of a certified public key, which is used in the protocol to mutually authenticate each other), which is also rarely used in practice. We believe that our analysis of TLS-DHE is nevertheless of practical value, for the following reasons:
First, the TLS-DHE-based ciphersuite TLS DHE DSS WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA is mandatory for TLS 1.0 and 1.1, which are both still in widespread use. Only the most recent version TLS 1.2 prescribes TLS-RSA as mandatory. So one could theoretically configure a considerable amount of servers to use only TLS-DHE and benefit from the provable security guarantees of TLS-DHE as provided in our security analysis.
Second, we can show that TLS-DHE provides perfect forward secrecy -a very strong form of security, which basically states that future compromises of longterm secrets do no threaten past communication sessions. With encrypted key transport, as in TLS-RSA, this is not achievable, since an attacker that compromises the long-term key (the private decryption key) can easily obtain session keys from previous sessions by just decrypting recorded ciphertexts. To better protect users from the consequences of such key compromise attacks and offer better longterm security, service providers might therefore consider to switch to the (exclusive) use of TLS-DHE. Recently, Google has made a first step in that direction, by announcing that it will switch over to TLS-DHE as the default key exchange method for its services to provide (and push) perfect forward secrecy [2] .
Third, it seems that giving a security proof of the actually most widespread option TLS-RSA is impossible in the standard model. Any approach we can think of would require IND-CCA-security of the encryption scheme used to transport the premaster secret from the client to the server, as otherwise we cannot simulate protocol executions while still being able to argue with indistinguishability of premaster secrets. But unfortunately it is well-known that the RSA-PKCS v1.5 scheme used in TLS is vulnerable to chosen-ciphertext attacks [7] . This problem was circumvented in previous work by either using an abstract publickey encryption scheme which is IND-CCA-secure [20] , or by assuming PKCS#1 v2.0 (RSA-OAEP), which is not used in TLS, and omitting authentication [17] .
Our work can also be seen as a 'stepping stone' towards a TLS version with a complete security proof in the standard model. Essentially, we identify certain security properties and prove that the TLS protocol framework yields a secure ACCE protocol under the assumption that the TLS building blocks satisfy these properties.
Related Work
Because of its eminent role, TLS and its building blocks have been subject to several security analyses. We mention only the works closely related to ours here, a more complete overview can be found in [18] .
Gajek et al. [17] presented the first security analysis of the complete TLS protocol, combining Handshake and Record Layer, in the UC framework [9] for all three key exchange protocols static Diffie-Hellman, ephemeral signed DiffieHellman, and encrypted key transport. The ideal functionalities described in this paper are much weaker than the security guarantees we expect from TLS, since only unauthenticated key exchange is considered. The paper furthermore assumes that RSA-OAEP is used for encrypted key transport, which is not the case for current versions of TLS.
Morissey et al. [20] analysed, in a paper that is closest to our results, the security of the truncated TLS Handshake protocol in the random oracle model and provided a modular proof of security. They make extensive use of the random oracle model to separate the three layers in the TLS Handshake they define, and to switch from computational to indistinguishability based security models. The use of the random oracle model is justified by the authors of [20] since it seems impossible to prove the PKCS#1 v1.5 based ciphersuites of TLS secure in the standard model. This argumentation does not affect our work, since we consider Diffie-Hellman-based ciphersuites.
Paterson et al. [22] introduce the notion of length-hiding authenticated encryption, which captures the properties expected from the data encryption in the TLS Record Layer. Most importantly, they were able to show that CBC-based ciphersuites of TLS 1.1 and 1.2 meet this security notion. This work matches nicely our results on the TLS Handshake protocol, and is an important building block for our work.
Very recently, Brzuska et al. [8] proposed relaxed game-based security notions for key exchange. This approach may serve as an alternative to our ACCE-based approach to circumvent the impossibility of proving the TLS Handshake protocol secure in a key-indistinguishability-based security model.
Remark on Our Choice of the Security Model
Authenticated key exchange (AKE) is a basic building block in modern cryptography. However, since many different security models for different purposes exist [3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 13, 19, 12] , the choice of the right model is not an easy task, and must be considered carefully. We have to take into account that we cannot modify any detail in the TLS protocol, nor in the network protocols preceding it. We have chosen an enhanced variant of the first model of Bellare and Rogaway [4] . Variants of this model have also been studied by [12, 6] , and especially by [20] . Detailed reasons for our choice are given in the full version [18] .
Preliminaries and Definitions
We denote with ∅ the empty string, and with [n] = {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N the set of integers between 1 and n. If A is a set, then a $ ← A denotes the action of sampling a uniformly random element from A. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then a $ ← A denotes that A is run with fresh random coins and returns a. In addition to the complexity assumption described in the sequel, we need the standard security notions of digital signatures (EUF-CMA), pseudo-random functions, and the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. These are detailed in the full version [18] .
The PRF-Oracle-Diffie-Hellman (PRF-ODH) Assumption. Let G be a group with generator g. Let PRF be a deterministic function z = PRF(X, m), taking as input a key X ∈ G and some bit string m, and returning a string z ∈ {0, 1} μ . Consider the following security experiment played between a challenger C and an adversary A. 
The adversary
The PRF-Oracle-Diffie-Hellman (PRF-ODH) assumption is a variant of the ODH assumption introduced by Abdalla, Bellare and Rogaway in [1] , adopted from hash functions to PRFs. In contrast to allowing a polynomial number of queries as in the original assumption [1] , we allow only a single oracle query.
Stateful Length-Hiding Authenticated Encryption. The following description and security model was obtained from the authors of [22] via personal communication. See [22] for a detailed discussion and motivation of this security notion.
A 
Transport Layer Security
The current version of TLS is 1.2 [16] coexists with its predecessors TLS 1.0 [14] and TLS 1.1 [15] . In the following we give a description of all messages sent during the TLS Handshake with ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange and client authentication (i.e. for ciphersuites TLS DHE *). This description and its illustration in Figure 2 are valid for all TLS versions since v1.0. Our description makes use of several 'state variables' (Λ, k, Π, ρ, st). For instance, variable Λ ∈ {accept, reject} determines whether one party 'accepts' or 'rejects' an execution of the protocol, or variable k stores the session key. These variables will also appear later in our security model (Section 4).
The TLS Handshake protocol consists of 13 messages, whose content ranges from constant byte values to tuples of cryptographic values. Not all messages are relevant for our security proof, we list them merely for completeness. All messages are prepended with a numeric tag that identifies the type of message, a length value, and the version number of TLS. All messages are sent through the TLS Record Layer, which at startup provides no encryption nor any other cryptographic transformations.
Message m 1 is the Client Hello message. It contains four values, two of which are optional. For our analysis the only important value is r C , the random value chosen by the client. It consists of 32 bytes (256 Bits), where 4 Bytes are usually used to encode the local time of the client. The remaining 28 Bytes are chosen randomly by the client. This is followed by a list cs-list of ciphersuites, where each ciphersuite is a tuple of key exchange method, signing, encryption and MAC algorithms, coded as two bytes. Data compression is possible before encryption and is signaled by the inclusion of zero or more compression methods. 
Fig. 2. Handshake protocol for ciphersuites TLS DHE * with client authentication
The Server Hello message m 2 has the same structure as Client Hello, with the only exception that at most one ciphersuite and one compression method can be present. Message m 3 may contain a certificate (or a chain of certificates, which is not considered in this paper) and the public key in the certificate must match the ciphersuite chosen by the server. For ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the public key may be any key that can be used to sign messages. The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange parameters are contained in the Server Key Exchange message m 4 , including information on the DH group (e.g. prime number p and generator g for a prime-order q subgroup of Z * p ), the DH share T S , and a signature computed over these values plus the two random numbers r C and r S . The next two messages are very simple: the Certificate Request message m 5 only contains a list of certificate types that the client may use to authenticate itself, and the Server Hello Done message m 6 does not contain any data, but consists only of a constant tag with byte-value '14' and a length value '0'.
Having received these messages, the signature σ S is verified. If this fails, the client 'rejects' and aborts, otherwise the client completes the key exchange and computes the cryptographic keys. The Client Certificate message m 7 contains a signing certificate cert C with the public key pk C of the client.
1 Message m 8 is called Client Key Exchange, and contains the Diffie-Hellman share T C of the client. To authenticate the client, a signature σ C is computed on a concatenation of all previous messages (up to m 8 ) and padded prefixes and sent in the Certificate Verify message m 9 .
The client is now also able to compute the premaster secret pms, from which all further secret values are derived. After computing the master secret ms, it is stored for the lifetime of the TLS session, and pms is erased from memory. The master secret ms is subsequently used, together with the two random nonces, to derive all encryption and MAC keys as well as the Client Finished message fin C . More precisely, the key material is computed as
After these computations have been completed, the keys are handed over to the TLS Record Layer of the client, which is now able to MAC and encrypt any data. To signal the 'start of encryption' to the server, a single message m 10 (Change Cipher Spec) with byte value '1' (f lag enc ) is sent unencrypted to S. Then message m 11 consists of an authenticated encryption of the Client Finished message fin C . After the server has received messages m 7 , m 8 , m 9 , the server verifies the signature in m 9 . If this fails, the server 'rejects' (i.e. sets Λ = 'reject') and aborts. Otherwise it first determines pms and ms. From this the encryption and MAC keys are computed as in (1) . It can then decrypt m 11 and check fin C by computing the pseudo-random value on the messages sent and received by the server. If this check fails, it 'rejects' and aborts. If the check is successful, it 'accepts' (i.e. sets Λ = 'accept'), computes the Server Finished message fin S and sends messages m 12 and m 13 to the client. If the check of fin S on the client side is successful, the client also 'accepts'. The obtained keys can now be used to transmit payload data in the TLS Record Layer using a stateful symmetric encryption scheme (StE.Enc, StE.Dec).
Abbreviated TLS Handshakes, side-channels and cross-protocol attacks. In our analysis, we do not consider the abbreviated TLS Handshake, but note that the server can always enforce an execution of the full protocol. Moreover, we do not consider attacks based on side-channels, such as error messages, or cross-protocol attacks like [24] .
AKE Protocols
While the established security models for, say, encryption (e.g. IND-CPA or IND-CCA security), or digital signatures (e.g., EUF-CMA), are clean and simple, a more complex model is required to model the capabilities of active adversaries to define secure authenticated key-exchange. An important line of research [6, 10, 19, 13] dates back to Bellare and Rogaway [4] , where an adversary is provided with an 'execution environment', which emulates the real-world capabilities of an active adversary, which has full control over the communication network. In the sequel we describe a variant of this model, which captures adaptive corruptions, perfect forward secrecy, and security against key-compromise impersonation attacks in a public-key setting.
Execution Environment. Consider a set of parties {P 1 , . . . , P }, ∈ N, where each party P i ∈ {P 1 , . . . , P } is a (potential) protocol participant and has a longterm key pair (pk i , sk i ). To model several sequential and parallel executions of the protocol, each party P i is modeled by a collection of oracles π j that points to a public key pk j used to perform authentication.
2
-Variable ρ ∈ {Client, Server}.
-Some additional temporary state variable st (which may, for instance, be used to store ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exponents or a transcript of messages). The internal state of each oracle is initialized to (Λ, k, Π, ρ, st) = (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), where V = ∅ denotes that variable V is undefined. Furthermore, we will always assume (for simplicity) that k = ∅ if an oracle has not reached accept-state (yet), and contains the computed key if an oracle is in accept-state, so that we have
An adversary may interact with these oracles by issuing the following queries.
The adversary can use this query to send message m to oracle π s i . The oracle will respond according to the protocol specification, depending on its internal state. If the attacker asks the first Send-query to oracle π s i , then the oracle checks whether m = consists of a special 'initialization' symbol . If true, then it sets its internal variable ρ := Client and responds with the first protocol message. Otherwise it sets ρ := Server and responds as specified in the protocol. 3 The variables Λ, k, Π, st are also set after certain Send-queries. Security Definition. Bellare and Rogaway [4] have introduced the notion of matching conversations in order to define correctness and security of an AKE protocol precisely. We denote with T i,s the sequence that consists of all messages sent and received by π s i in chronological order (not including the initializationsymbol ). We also say that T i,s is the transcript of π s i . For two transcripts T i,s and T j,t , we say that T i,s is a prefix of T j,t , if T i,s contains at least one message, and the messages in T i,s are identical to and in the same order as the first |T i,s | messages of T j,t .
Definition 3 (Matching conversations). We say that π s i has a matching conversation to π t j , if -T j,t is a prefix of T i,s and π s i has sent the last message(s), or -T i,s is a prefix of T j,t and π t j has sent the last message(s).
3 Note that we assume that learning identities of communication partners (which is necessary to determine the public-key used to perform authentication) is part of the protocol. 4 For details on when and how they are set in TLS, see the description in Section 3 and Figure 2 . 5 Note, that the adversary does not 'take control' of oracles corresponding to a corrupted party. But he learns the long-term secret key, and can henceforth simulate these oracles.
Security of AKE protocols is now defined by requiring that (i) the protocol is a secure authentication protocol, and (ii) the protocol is a secure key-exchange protocol.
AKE Game. We formally capture this notion as a game, played between an adversary A and a challenger C. The challenger implements the collection of oracles {π
At the beginning of the game, the challenger generates long-term key pairs (pk i , sk i ) for all i ∈ [ ]. The adversary receives the public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk as input. Now the adversary may start issuing Send, Reveal and Corrupt queries, as well as one Test-query. Finally, the adversary outputs a bit b and terminates. then the probability that A outputs b which equals the bit b sampled by the Test-query satisfies
Definition 4. We say that an adversary (t, )-breaks an AKE protocol, if
|Pr[b = b ] − 1/2| ≥ .
We say that an AKE protocol is (t, )-secure, if there exists no adversary that (t, )-breaks it.
Remark 1. Note that the above definition even allows to corrupt oracles involved in the Test-session (of course only after the Test-oracle has reached acceptstate, in order to exclude trivial attacks). Thus, protocols secure with respect to this definition provide perfect forward secrecy. Note also that we allow the 'accepting' oracle to be corrupted even before it reaches accept-state, which provides security against key-compromise impersonation attacks.
Now we can prove the security of a modified version of the TLS Handshake protocol. As discussed in the introduction, it is impossible to prove the full TLS Handshake protocol secure in any security model based on key-indistinguishability, like the model from Section 4, because the encryption and MAC of the Finished messages provide a 'check value', that can be exploited by an adversary to determine the bit b chosen by the Test-query.
Therefore we consider a 'truncated TLS' protocol as in [20, 21] . In this truncated version, we assume that the Finished messages are sent in clear, that is, neither encrypted nor authenticated by a MAC. More precisely, we modify the TLS protocol depicted in Figure 2 such that messages m 11 and m 13 contain only fin Π (instead of StE.Enc(k Π enc , len, H, fin Π , st e )), allowing us to prove security in the above model.
Theorem 1.
Let μ be the output length of PRF and let λ be the length of the nonces r C and r S . Assume that the pseudo-random function PRF is (t, prf )-secure, the signature scheme is (t, sig )-secure, the DDH-problem is (t, ddh )-hard in the group G used to compute the TLS premaster secret, and the PRF-ODHproblem is (t, prfodh )-hard with respect to G and PRF.
Then for any adversary that (t , ttls )-breaks the truncated TLS-DHE protocol in the sense of Definition 4 with t ≈ t holds that
Proof Sketch. Let us sketch the proof of Theorem 1, more details can be found in the full version [18] . We consider three types of adversaries:
1. Adversaries that succeed in making an oracle accept maliciously, such that the first oracle that does so is a Client-oracle (i.e., an oracle with ρ = Client).
We call such an adversary a Client-adversary. 2. Adversaries that succeed in making an oracle accept maliciously, such that the first oracle that does so is a Server-oracle (i.e., an oracle with ρ = Server).
We call such an adversary a Server-adversary. 3. Adversaries that do not succeed in making any oracle accept maliciously, but which answer the Test-challenge. We call such an adversary a Test-adversary.
We prove Theorem 1 by three lemmas. Lemma 1 bounds the probability client that a Client-adversary succeeds, Lemma 2 bounds the probability server that a Server-adversary succeeds, and Lemma 3 bounds the success probability ke of a Test-adversary. Then we have ttls ≤ client + server + ke .
Lemma 1. For any adversary A running in time t ≈ t, the probability that there exists an oracle π s i with ρ = Client that accepts maliciously is at most
where all quantities are defined as stated in Theorem 1.
Proof Sketch. We prove Lemma 1 in a sequence of games [5, 23] .
Game 0. This is the original security experiment. i * , and aborts if its guess is wrong. Again the guess is correct with probability at least 1/d . Game 5. Now we are in a game where the challenger controls both DiffieHellman shares T C = g tc and T S = g ts chosen and received by π s * i * . A natural approach would be to use the DDH assumption now to replace the premaster-secret pms = g tcts with an independent random value pms, in order to be able to use the security of the PRF( pms, ·) as an argument in a following game to replace the master secret ms with an independent ms. However, unfortunately we cannot do this, as this would lead to a problem with the simulation of the fin S -message sent by π t * j * (we describe this issue in more detail in Section 6). Instead, we use the PRF-ODH-assumption to directly replace the master secret ms with an independent value ms. We use the oracle provided by the PRF-ODH-assumption to simulate the fin S message if necessary, which allows us to overcome the mentioned problem. Game 6. In this game the challenger replaces the function PRF( ms, ·) with a truly random function. Note that ms is an independent random value, thus we can use the security of the PRF to argue that this game is indistinguishable from Game 5. Game 7. Finally, we use the fact that in this game a truly random function is used to verify the finished-message fin S received by π s * i * , to conclude that π s * i * accepts maliciously with probability at most 2 −μ .
Lemma 2.
For any adversary A running in time t ≈ t, the probability that there exists an oracle π s i with ρ = Server that accepts maliciously is at most
Proof Sketch. The proof of Lemma 2 is very similar to the proof of Lemma 2, except that the problem with the simulation of the fin S message does not occur in the case where we are dealing with Server-adversaries. Therefore we are able to base security in this case on the standard DDH assumption instead of the non-standard PRF-ODH assumption. (This is the reason why we consider Clientand Server-adversaries separately).
Lemma 3.
For any adversary A running in time t ≈ t, the probability that A answers the Test-challenge correctly is at most 1/2 + ke with
where client + server is an upper bound on the probability that there exists an oracle that accepts maliciously in the sense of Definition 4 (cf. Lemmas 1 and 2) and all other quantities are defined as stated in Theorem 1.
Proof Sketch. In order to prove Lemma 3, we first use the bounds derived in Lemmas 1 and 2 on the probability that there exists a Client-or Server-oracle that accepts maliciously. We then employ a very similar sequence of games as in the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2. Recall that the keys in the real protocol are computed as
and in the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 we have first replaced ms with an independent value ms, and then the function PRF( ms, ·) with a truly random function. Once we have reached this game, the adversary will always receive an independent key vector K Summing up probabilities from Lemmas 1 to 3, we obtain that
ACCE Protocols
An authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) protocol is a protocol executed between two parties. The protocol consists of two phases, called the 'pre-accept' phase and the 'post-accept' phase.
Pre-accept phase. In this phase a 'handshake protocol' is executed. In terms of functionality this protocol is an AKE protocol as in Section 4, that is, both communication partners are mutually authenticated, and a session key k is established. However, it need not necessarily meet the security definition for AKE protocols (Definition 4). This phase ends, when both communication partners reach an accept-state. Post-accept phase. This phase is entered, when both communication partners reach accept-state. In this phase data can be transmitted, encrypted and authenticated with key k. The prime example for an ACCE protocol is TLS. Here, the pre-accept phase consists of the TLS Handshake protocol. In the post-accept phase encrypted and authenticated data is transmitted over the TLS Record Layer.
To define security of ACCE protocols, we combine the security model for authenticated key exchange from Section 4 with stateful length-hiding encryption in the sense of [22] . Technically, we provide a slightly modified execution environment that extends the types of queries an adversary may issue.
Execution environment. The execution environment is very similar to the model from Section 4, except for a few simple modifications. We extend the model such that in the post-accept phase an adversary is also able to 'inject' chosen-plaintexts by making an Encrypt-query, and chosen-ciphertexts by making a Decrypt-query. Moreover, each oracle π Again this notion is captured by a game, played between an adversary A and a challenger C. The challenger implements the collection of oracles {π whose internal secret bit the attacker tries to determine. Of course this is only allowed after π s i has reached accept-state, in order to exclude trivial attacks. Thus, protocols secure with respect to this definition provide perfect forward secrecy. Note also that again we allow the 'accepting' oracle to be corrupted even before it reaches accept-state, which provides security against key-compromise impersonation attacks.
Relation to the AKE Security Definition from Section 4. Note that an ACCE protocol can be constructed in a two-step approach.
1. (AKE part) First an authenticated key-exchange (AKE) protocol is executed. This protocol guarantees the authenticity of the communication partner, and provides a cryptographically 'good' (i.e., for the attacker indistinguishable from random) session key.
(Symmetric part)
The session key is then used in a symmetric encryption scheme providing integrity and confidentiality.
This modular approach is simple and generic, and therefore appealing. It can be shown formally that this two-step approach yields a secure ACCE protocol, if the 'AKE part' meets the security in the sense of Definition 4, and the 'symmetric part' consists of a suitable authenticated symmetric encryption scheme (e.g. secure according to Definition 2). However, if the purpose of the protocol is the establishment of an authenticated confidential channel, then it is not necessary that the 'AKE-part' of the protocol provides full indistinguishability of session keys. It actually would suffice if encrypted messages are indistinguishable, and cannot be altered by an adversary. These requirements are strictly weaker than indistinguishability of keys in the sense of Definition 4, and thus easier to achieve (possibly from weaker hardness assumptions, or by more efficient protocols).
We stress that our ACCE definition is mainly motivated by the fact that security models based on key indistinguishability do not allow for a security analysis of full TLS, as detailed in the introduction. We do not want to propose ACCE as a new security notion for key exchange protocols, since it is very complex and the modular two-step approach approach seems more useful in general. ) of the stateful encryption scheme, were replaced with independent random values. This allows us to extend the sequence of games by one final game, where the security of TLS-DHE is reduced to the sLHAE-security (in the sense of Definition 2) of the underlying stateful encryption scheme.
Theorem 2. Let
Note that the above adversary is a valid, successful adversary in the real security experiment. It does not issue any Reveal-query and only one Corrupt-query to an unrelated party, such that the intended communication partner Π = S of C = π s i remains uncorrupted, but still it makes C = π s i 'accept' and there is no oracle that C has a matching conversation to.
However, we explain why we will not be able to use this adversary in a simulated security experiment, where the challenger does not know the exponent t S of T S = g tS . Intuitively, the reason is that in this case the challenger would first have to compute the Finished-message fin * S , where fin * S = PRF(ms, m 1 || . . . ||m 3 ) and ms = PRF(T t * S , label 1 ||r C ||r S ), but 'knowing' neither t S = log T S , nor t * = log T * . This is the technical problem we are faced with, if we want to prove security under a standard assumption like DDH. Under the PRF-ODH-assumption, we can however use the given oracle to compute first ms, and from this the Finished-message fin * S . Interestingly, the above technical problem does not appear if we consider only Server-adversaries (i.e., adversaries that make an oracle π s i accept maliciously with ρ = Server) instead. This is due to an asymmetry of the TLS-DHE Handshake protocol, see [18] for details.
One can circumvent the above problem, and thus base the security proof on the standard DDH assumption instead of PRF-ODH, if one considers a weaker security model where no Corrupt-queries are allowed (which however seems not adequate for the way how TLS-DHE is used on the Internet).
In [11] Canetti and Krawczyk describe a protocol called Σ 0 , which exhibits many similarities to the TLS-DHE Handshake protocol, but is provably secure under standard assumptions (in particular under DDH instead of PRF-ODH). We discuss why the subtle differences between Σ 0 and TLS-DHE are crucial in [18, Section 8] . We also note that one could, in principle, make TLS-DHE provably secure under standard assumptions, if one would modify it such that it becomes more similar to Σ 0 , which would allow to carry the security analysis of Σ 0 from [11] over to TLS-DHE. Of course it seems unrealistic that such substantial changes become accepted in practice.
Conclusion
We have shown that the core cryptographic protocol underlying TLS-DHE provides a secure establishment of confidential and authenticated channels. We can avoid the random oracle model, if we make a suitable assumption on the pseudorandom function. The goal of this work is to analyse TLS-DHE on the protocol layer. As common in cryptographic protocol analyses, we therefore have ignored implementational issues like error messages, which of course might also be used to break the security of the protocol. We leave it as an interesting open question to find an adequate approach for modeling such side-channels in complex scenarios like AKE involving many parties and parallel, sequential, and concurrent executions.
The whole TLS protocol suite is much more complex than the cryptographic protocol underlying TLS-DHE. It is very flexible, as it allows to negotiate ciphersuites at the beginning of the protocol, or to resume sessions using an abbreviated TLS Handshake. So clearly the security analysis of TLS is not finished yet, there are still many open questions. However, we consider this work as a strong indicator for the soundness of the TLS protocol framework. We believe that future revisions of the TLS standard should be guided by provable security -ideally in the standard model.
